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LABOR LAW: READING PROVISION IN NLRB ORDER IS
INAPPROPRIATE EXCEPT IN EXTREME CASES
REQUIRING an employer to read an NLRB order to his employees
has been held by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, in International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB,1
to be an inappropriate remedy and one which will be enforced only
in extreme cases. Four months after initiating an organizational
campaign among employees of Scott's, Inc., the IUE filed unfair labor
practice charges with the NLRB. The trial examiner and the Board
found that the company had deliberately engaged in extensive viola-
tions of sections 8 (a) (1) to (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act.2 Among other remedies, the NLRB directed the company to
post on plant bulletin boards notices stating the employer's intention
to remedy past unfair practices and to respect enumerated employee
rights, to mail a copy to each employee at his home, and to read the
notice to assembled employees during working hours.3  Upon peti-
tion by the union for review, and by the NLRB for enforcement, the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Board's findings and orders,
except for the requirement of the oral reading of the employee
notice.4
The National Labor Relations Board has wide latitude in issuing
orders and formulating remedies; the National Labor Relations Act
specifies only that orders and remedies must effectuate its policies.5
This requirement has been interpreted to mean that the orders of
the Board are to be corrective rather than punitive,6 and must be
designed to restore the status quo by counteracting the detrimental
effects of an unfair labor practice.7 Because the relationship of policy
1383 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1967), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S.
Dec. 12, 1967) (No. 878), modifying Scott's, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (June 30, 1966).
229 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a) (1)- (3) (1964).
8 Scott's, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (June 30, 1966).
883 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1967), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S.
Dec. 12, 1967) (No. 878).
"National Labor Relations Act § 10 (c), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c) (1964).
"Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11-12 (1940); Consolidated Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938); Marshfield Steel Co. v. NLRB, 324 F.2d 33, 837-
38 (8th Cir. 1963); Nabors v. NLR.B, 323 F.2d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 911 (1964); NLRB v. Teamsters Local 996, 813 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1963).7 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941); Ladies' Garment Workers' Local 57 v.
NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 300 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967).
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to remedy is considered a matter peculiarly within administrative
competence, the Board's remedial power is subject to limited judicial
review.8 Thus, an order should be affirmed, the Supreme Court
has held, unless it is found to be a patent attempt to achieve a result
not implementing the policies of the Act.9
A conclusion by the Board that an employer has committed an
unfair labor practice will usually result in an order that the employer
post a signed notice to the effect that, in accordance with the decision
of the NLRB, the employer will take certain remedial actions and
will not engage in specified unfair labor practices. Prior to the
IUE case, the NLRB on several occasions has required employers
to read this notice to the employees. 1. The Fourth Circuit has en-
forced the reading provision without discussion of its propriety."1
A similar remedy was approved by the Second Circuit in J. P. Stevens
& Company v. NLR-B, 12 with the modification that the company be
given the option of having the notice read by a Board representative.
The Stevens court, accepting the Board's reasoning that the reading
would insure effective communication to employees of the Board's
order, noted that the humiliating aspects of the public reading were
lessened by the modification and by the omission from the notice of
an admission of past offenses.' 3 In NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage
Warehouse Company,4 a Board order requiring an employer to read
a notice to its employees was rejected by the Fifth Circuit although
it had enforced a similar provision in an earlier case.'8 The trial
8 National Labor Relations Act § 10 (e), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) (1964); see NLRB v.
Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177 (1941).
9Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1964); Virginia
Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943).
2 0 J.P. Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 879 (1966), modified, 380 F.2d 292 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967); Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 151
N.L.R.B. 248, 249 (1965), modified, 369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 458, 459 (1961); Jackson Tile Mfg. Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 764, 770 (1958),
enforced per curiam, 272 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1959); cf. Taylor-Colquitt Co., 47 N.L.R.B.
225, 257, enforced, 140 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1943).
13NLRB v. Taylor-Colquitt Co., 140 F.2d 92 (4th Cir.), enforcing 47 N.L.R.B. 225
(1943).
- 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967), modifying 157 N.L.R.B.
869 (1966).18 1d. at 304-05.
1 369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966), modifying 151 N.L.R.B. 248 (1965).
25 jackson Tile Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 272 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1959), enforcing per
curiam 122 N.L.R.B. 764 (1958).
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examiner's recommended order-which because of employee illiteracy
had compelled a reading to any employee requesting it'6-was modi-
fied by the Board to require the employer to read the notice once
to each employee, singly or collectively.17 Disregarding the employee
illiteracy, the Fifth Circuit summarily concluded that the reading
provision was "unnecessarily embarrassing and humiliating to man-
agement ..... " and would not work to promote the policies of the
Act.'8
In concluding in IUE that the prescribed reading was an in-
appropriate means of informing employees of their rights under the
Act, the District of Columbia Circuit stated that the oral read-
ing would impair future labor relations by further alienating
employers and union members, and agreed with the Laney &
Duke Storage court that such action was unnecessarily humiliating
to management.' 9 Conceding that such a remedy might possibly
be justified by extreme actions on the part of an employer or
union, the court concluded that in the usual case a forced public
reading amounted to a "'confession of sins' . . . incompatible with
the democratic principles of the dignity of man."20 Judge Wright,
dissenting in part, argued that the remedies prescribed did not
meet the criterion established by the Supreme Court for judicial
rejection of an NLRB order.21 He further contended that any com-
plication created by the order could be eliminated by enforcement
with the modification adopted in Stevens. The majority rejected the
Stevens modification with the assertion that such an alteration would
amount to a new order, and thus would exceed the court's authority.
In addition, the majority found the Stevens change substantively
unacceptable because it promoted the Board's participation in a
controversy from which it should remain neutral, and would destroy
the laboratory conditions necessary for any future election.22
The specific facts of IUE reveal sound reasons for enforcement
of the Board's reading order. The vice-president of the company
had assembled employees and verbalized the company's policy of
10 151 N.L.R.B. at 267.
'7 Id. at 249.
18 369 F.2d at 869.
10 383 F.2d at 233-34.
20 Id. at 234.
21 Id.
22 Id. at n.5.
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opposition to unionization, outlining actions taken by the company
in other subsidiaries. 23 Unlike a posting or mailing which might
be disregarded by employees, a public reading would ensure that
the compliance notice was communicated to all who heard the
company's threats. Further, in evaluating the reading provision,
the JUE court inquired whether the remedy chosen by the NLRB
was "inappropriate to achieve the sought-after goal of dissemina-
tion of information concerning employees' rights."24  This stan-
dard arguably allows greater judicial latitude for rejection than
does the criterion established by the Supreme Court, i.e., whether
the remedy is "a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those
which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act." 2
Any humiliating aspects of the reading provision do appear to
be avoided by the Stevens modification. Furthermore, since Judge
Wright's proposal would involve a non-factual amendment, the
literal language of the Act allowing court "modification" of NLRB
orders26 does not appear to require the conclusion that altering the
order to provide an optional Board reading was beyond the court's
power. Though the legislative history of the NLRA does not discuss
the extent of the courts' modification powers when non-factual deter-
minations are involved,27 alterations of the same nature as that in
Stevens have been undertaken by other courts but without an analysis
of the authorization to do S0.28 The IUE court's further criticism
that the Stevens alteration would involve the Board too deeply in
the controversy is weakened by the Board's prior, well-known in-
volvement in the case.
The reading provision ordered in IUE is a relatively novel
NLRB remedy and, as one commentator has suggested on the basis
of an extensive empirical study of unfair labor cases, may be of
23 159 N.L.R.B. No. 146, at 5-6 (June 30, 1966).
2383 F.2d at 232-33.
2Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943). See note 10 supra.
26National Labor Relations Act § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) (1964).
27 See NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 1935
(1949); NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Aar, 1947
(1948).
28 See NLRB v. Operating Eng'rs Local 138, 293 F.2d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 1961), modi-
fying 123 N.L.R.B. 1393 (1959) (modification to make union primarily liable and
employer secondarily liable); NLRB v. Hollywood-Maxwell Co., 126 F.2d 815, 819 (9th
Cir. 1942), modifying 24 N.L.R.B. 645 (1940) (modification to include description of
employer's dishonesty and requiring Board's notice to be posted).
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significant remedial value in some contexts. 29  When employees are
illiterate or transient, an oral reading may be the only effective
method of informing them of their NLRA rights. Unless the
court would view these as "extreme cases," the IUE decision tends
to restrict the NLRB by stifling the creativity required for effective
remedy formulation in such situations.30
20 Ross, Analysis of Administrative Process Under Taft Hartley, 63 LAB. REL. REP.
132, 153 (1966).
8o See Note, The Need for Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1963).
